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Recent studies on political ideology suggest the existence of partisan di-
vides on matters of foreign and security policy, challenging the notion that
“politics stops at the water’s edge.” However, when taken as a whole, ex-
tant work provides decidedly mixed evidence of party-political differences
outside domestic politics. This article first conducts a systematic empirical
analysis of the relationship between parties’ left–right positions and their
general attitude toward peace and security missions, which suggests that
right-leaning parties tend to be more supportive of military operations.
Yet, the results also show that the empirical pattern is curvilinear: centrist
and center–right parties witness the highest level of support for military
missions, while parties on both ends of the political spectrum show sub-
stantially less support. The second part of our analysis examines whether
the stronger support of rightist parties for peace and security missions
translates into a greater inclination of right-wing governments to actu-
ally deploy forces for military operations. Strikingly, our results suggest
that leftist governments were actually more inclined to participate in op-
erations than their right-leaning counterparts. The greater willingness of
left-wing executives to deploy military forces is the result of their greater
inclination to participate in operations with inclusive goals.
Introduction
Recent studies on political ideology suggest the existence of partisan divides on
matters of foreign and security policy, thereby challenging the traditional notion
that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” However, as highlighted in the introduction
to this special issue (Raunio and Wagner 2020), there is a lack of systematic empir-
ical work on political parties in foreign and security policy. Moreover, extant work
provides decidedly mixed evidence of party-political differences outside domestic
politics. Some studies indicate the existence of ideological differences between
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political parties on the use of military force, and others provide evidence that
party-political differences also have an impact on military deployment decisions.
Yet, large-N studies on the link between government ideology and the use of
force generally do not focus on the post-Cold War period, when the frequency
of military operations increased, and their goals changed substantially. Research
on specific military operations indicates that the effects of partisanship do not
apply equally to all cases of military deployment: while right-wing governments
might be more inclined to support operations deployed to defend narrow national
interests, left-leaning executives seem to be more supportive of operations with
inclusive goals such as humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations.
Unfortunately, whether or not the context of the operation has an impact on the
effect of government ideology has not yet been explored in a systematic fashion.
In this paper, we aim to fill these substantial gaps in the literature by providing
a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between ideological positions of
political parties and support for military deployment across twenty-four European
countries. Hence, in line with the aims of this special issue, the paper tests the first,
second, and sixth hypothesis outlined in Raunio and Wagner (2020), specifically ex-
ploring whether (1) support for military operations is greater among right-leaning
parties, (2) there is cross-party consensus on humanitarian military interventions,
and (3) left governments are less inclined to actually use military force.
In line with the introduction, we consider the examination of party positions and
their actual impact on government policy as interrelated but separate questions. In
the first part of our analysis, we examine the relationship between various indicators
of political ideology and the general support for peace and security operations as
indicated in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES; Bakker et al. 2015). The second
part of our analysis focuses on actual military deployment decisions and examines the
relationship between government ideology on a left–right scale and participation
in eight military operations, drawing on a newly created data set. To estimate
party-political positions, we use data from two widely used alternative sources: the
2010 and 2014 versions of the CHES data set and corresponding data from the
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006).
The results of the first part of our analysis largely confirm our theoretical expec-
tation that right-leaning parties are generally more supportive of the use of force
than left-leaning parties. Yet, contrary to widely held assumptions about a linear
relationship between political ideology and support for military missions, we show
that the empirical pattern is curvilinear, which also resonates with recent work done
by Wagner et al. (2017, 2018). This means that centrist parties and center–right
parties show the highest level of support for military operations, whereas support
levels drop on the far-left and far-right sides of the political spectrum.
However, the second part of our analysis shows that right-wing governments are
not more inclined to actually deploy forces for military operations. Not only is the
relationship between ideology and support for military operations less pronounced
when looking at military deployment decisions, but also our results suggest that
leftist governments decided more often in favor of military operations than their
right-leaning counterparts. Examining different types of military operations suggests
that this is mainly the result of the greater inclination of left-wing executives to
participate in operations with inclusive goals. In contrast, right-wing governments
were more likely to participate in operations with strategic goals than left-wing
governments. Hereby, our analysis confirms the conclusions from recent case-based
research that the context of an operation has an impact on the effect of executive
ideology.
This article is structured as follows. The first section discusses the academic litera-
ture on the link between political partisanship and support for military operations.
The second section elaborates on the research design, data sources, case selection,
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our analysis, which examines the relationship between party-political ideology and
general positions toward military operations. The fourth section focuses on the link
between government ideology and military deployment decisions. The fifth section
discusses the results of the two parts of the analysis, after which the final section
recapitulates the study’s main conclusions and suggests areas for future research.
Party Politics and Security Policy
A large part of policy making in consolidated democracies is party politics. Hence, an
extensive literature emerged that explores the link between political partisanship
and domestic policy output, particularly on the issue of welfare state reform in
advanced industrial societies (e.g., Allan and Scruggs 2004; Iversen and Stephens
2008; Klitgaard, Schumacher, and Soentken 2015). Studies in comparative politics
largely support a policy-seeking conception of political parties, showing that parties
articulate policy preferences that resonate with their political ideology, submit
these to their constituencies through party manifestos, and seek to pass policy that
matches their political preferences (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994).
In general, left parties typically underscore economic regulation, welfare state
expansion, and a negative conception of the military, whereas right parties tend to
stress free enterprise, a restriction of social services, and a positive conception of
the military (Budge and Klingemann 2001; Volkens et al. 2013).
By contrast, the study of international relations and foreign policy analysis were
long characterized by the famous adage that “politics stops at the water’s edge,”
which implied that there was no room for partisanship when it came to the national
interest (see Rathbun 2004). This neorealist position was expressed, for instance, in
Gowa’s (1998) analysis of US conflict involvement, where Gowa argues that “politics
does stop at the water’s edge: the use of force abroad is invariant to both the
domestic political calendar and the partisan composition of government” (Gowa
1998, 307, original emphasis). However, when US Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg
coined the phrase in 1947 as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, it was
more of a plea than a fact (“we must stop politics at the water’s edge”) and since
then, party differences over security policy have rather grown larger in the United
States and elsewhere (Lieber 2014).
Notions of a broad party consensus on security matters have been challenged
by an emerging literature that enlarged the scope of partisan influence analysis
to foreign and security policy. These studies report systematic differences between
left and right parties on substantive questions regarding security policy and the
use of force (Palmer, Regan, and London 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009; Koch and
Sullivan 2010; Hofmann 2013; Mello 2014; Milner and Tingley 2015; Stevens 2015;
Haesebrouck 2017; Wagner et al. 2017). Hofmann (2013), for example, shows in
her study of the creation of European security institutions that partisanship shapes
government preferences in security policy and that ideological congruence across
governments fosters institution building. In their analysis of CHES data, Wagner et
al. (2017, 2018) show that right political parties across Europe tend to be more sup-
portive of military operations than their left counterparts. More specifically, their
study finds a curvilinear relationship between support for peace and security opera-
tions and party positions on the left–right scale, indicating that parties at the far left
and far right of the political spectrum are the least supportive of military operations.
Several studies examine whether party-political differences have an impact on
military deployment decisions. Palmer, Regan, and London (2004, 16) demonstrate
that right governments are more likely to become engaged in interstate conflict
than left governments. Similar findings are reported in a subsequent study by Arena
and Palmer (2009) for the period between 1960 and 1996. Studying the interaction
between partisanship and public opinion, Koch and Sullivan (2010) find left






/fpa/article/16/4/565/5911931 by guest on 13 January 2021
568 Patterns of Political Ideology and Security Policy
declines, based on a data set of military interventions initiated by France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States between 1960 and 2000.
Studies that build on expert survey data as well as large-N studies on the link
between government ideology and military intervention, thus, provide evidence
that right-leaning parties are more likely to support the use of force. Yet, the latter
studies generally do not focus on the post-Cold War period, when the goals of mil-
itary operations changed substantially. Moreover, neither research based on expert
survey data nor the aforementioned quantitative studies examine whether the goals
and the context of a military operation have an impact on the effect of government
ideology. Research on specific military operations, however, suggests that the effects
of partisanship do not apply equally to all cases of military deployment.
In their study of political support for the 2003 Iraq intervention, Schuster and
Maier (2006) demonstrate that in Western Europe, right-wing governments tended
to support the Iraq War while their left-leaning counterparts tended to oppose
it, but similar patterns were not found in Central and Eastern Europe. Mello
(2012) shows that these partisan differences also translated to war involvement
in Iraq, where unified right governments were able to override institutional veto
rights in several countries. Mello (2014) also demonstrates that right governments
were more willing to engage militarily in the Kosovo conflict. In an extension of
their argument about NATO operations in Afghanistan, Auerswald and Saideman
(2014, 211) explore partisan patterns for the military intervention in Libya. Over-
all, they find left governments to have been more supportive of the air strikes,
which they ascribe to the humanitarian and multilateral dimension of the mission.
Haesebrouck (2017) provides a comprehensive analysis of the NATO operation in
Libya across twenty-six countries and shows that left parties were more supportive
than their right counterparts. However, in a study on the air strikes against Daesh,
Haesebrouck (2018) finds no conclusive evidence that would support a partisan
argument. Yet, this could be another indication that “political conflict does not
arise equally over all types of military operations,” as argued by Mello (2014, 38).
These findings largely resonate with research conducted by Rathbun (2004,
2007), who reports significant differences between left and right parties in their
conception of the national interest and particularly their support for military inter-
vention. In an analysis of European participation in the operations in the Balkans,
Rathbun introduced a three-dimensional model, which expects leftist parties to not
only be more antimilitaristic, but also prefer pursuing their interests through mul-
tilateral frameworks and follow a more inclusive conception of the national interest
(Rathbun 2004, 18–21). Rightist parties on the other hand have a narrower concep-
tion of the national interest, consider the use of force an acceptable instrument in
international relations, and are more reluctant to delegate control to multilateral
institutions. In consequence, left-wing parties might actually be more supportive
than right-wing parties of multilateral operations that pursue humanitarian goals in
which there are no clear national interests at stake. According to Rathbun (2007),
one of the reasons why leftist parties are generally more antimilitaristic is because
they consider the use of force an act of subordination, which strengthens inequal-
ity between nations. Haesebrouck (2015) suggests that this is not the case for
peacekeeping operations, which are deployed with the consent of local actors. In
consequence, support for peacekeeping operations among left-wing governments
can be expected to be stronger than support for humanitarian interventions.
While most studies focus on centrist parties, the results of the in-depth case
studies by Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) as well as Coticchia and Davidson (2018)
on the impact of radical parties on Italian foreign policy resonate with the findings
of Wagner et al. (2017). However, Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) point out that the
radical right Italian Northern league did in fact support the “War on Terror” and
the deployment of Italian troops to Afghanistan. Coticchia and Davidson (2018), in
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but they were not willing to force a government collapse in order to prevent the
use of military force. These mixed findings suggest that the context of a military
operation should not be neglected as it might explain why fringe parties support
certain military operations but not others.
Few quantitative studies have examined the impact of far-right and far-left parties
on military intervention. Kaarbo and Beasley (2008, 77) argue that coalition gov-
ernments might be more extreme in their conflict–cooperation behavior because
ideological outlier junior parties might hijack coalitions. In a subsequent study,
they did not find evidence that the presence of junior partners resulted in more
extreme foreign policy behavior (Beasley and Kaarbo 2014). While Beasley and
Kaarbo do take into account the ideological position of junior parties, Clare (2010)
shows in his study that governments with ideological outlier parties engage in more
conflictual politics if the outlier party is farther to the right, and less conflictual
politics if it is situated on the left.
While numerous studies have identified systematic differences over security
policy between left and right parties, some research suggests that party positions
on military interventions might not be adequately captured by the traditional
left–right cleavage. Wagner et al. (2017) argue that diverging support for “wars
of choice” might be more connected to cultural than socio-economic cleavages.
To test this conjecture, they examine the link between support for military in-
tervention and the new politics dimension of the CHES data (Hooghe, Marks,
and Wilson 2002), which ranges from green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN). Their analysis shows that support for
military intervention declines at both ends of the scale. Yet, the actual impact of
such cultural differences on government policy has not yet been examined.
In sum, there is cross-case and case-specific evidence to bolster the notion that
right governments tend to be more supportive of military operations than left
governments. However, previous research indicates that the effects of partisanship
do not apply equally to all kinds of military operations.1 While the right side of
the political spectrum is generally expected to be more supportive of the military,
there are specific reasons for the left to support military operations, especially
military interventions that are justified on humanitarian grounds, as Rathbun
(2004) has documented and subsequent studies have confirmed for operations
in Libya and elsewhere (Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Haesebrouck 2017). Yet,
these conjectures have not yet been explored in a systematic fashion.
Based on this review, we expect to find systematic differences between left and
right parties. Specifically, right parties are expected to be willing to use the military
for defending more narrow national interests. Left parties, on the other hand, are
expected to be reluctant to use military force for geostrategic purposes, preferring
less coercive ways of conflict resolution instead. However, left-wing government
might actually be more inclined to use military force than their right-leaning
counterparts when humanitarian concerns are present, multilateral frameworks
available, and narrowly defined interests are not at stake.
Methods and Data
Our analysis of political ideology and security policy follows a two-pronged research
design. The first part of the empirical analysis explores the relationship between
various alternative indicators of political partisanship and parties’ general support
for military deployments to peace and security missions. This part seeks to shed
light on the question whether there are generalizable patterns in the relationship
between political ideology and security policy, and, if so, to what extent these are
1
Recent studies also highlight the importance of coalition dynamics that can influence the formation and durability
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independent of questions of measurement and regional scope. The second part
of the analysis investigates whether these empirical patterns also exist for the rela-
tionship between the “color” of a government and its decisions on actual military
operations. In other words, when in power, are rightist parties more inclined to
use military force than their leftist counterparts? Moreover, existing studies suggest
that military operations should be differentiated by kind because governments may
respond differently depending on their own circumstances, the kind of military
operation, or the interests at stake.
To estimate party-political positions, we employ data from two widely used alter-
native sources: the 2010 and 2014 versions of the CHES (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk
et al. 2017) and corresponding data from the CMP (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann
et al. 2006). As their names indicate, the CHES and CMP projects use different
approaches to measure party-political positions. The CHES data are based on the
judgment of academic experts, who have been asked to evaluate political parties
on various policy issues and ideological dimensions, including “overall ideological
stance” from extreme left to extreme right and the GAL/TAN scale, which seeks
to cover a “social left–right dimension” (Bakker et al. 2015, 144), capturing parties’
views on civil rights and democratic freedoms. The GAL/TAN scale ranges from
“Libertarian/Post-materialist” (0) to “Traditional/Authoritarian” (10).
In 2010 and 2014, the CHES survey further included a question about parties’
“position toward international security and peacekeeping,” asking respondents
to rank the respective party on a scale from 0 (“Strongly favors COUNTRY troop
deployment”) to 10 (“Strongly opposes COUNTRY troop deployment”). For the
2010 and 2014 CHES surveys, a total of 343 and 337 experts provided information
on twenty-eight and thirty-one countries, respectively (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al.
2017).2 While the CMP data also contain an aggregate measure of a party’s platform
on the issue of “international peace,” the resulting scores tend to be low across
the spectrum, which poses a problem for meaningful interpretation. Hence, for
the first part of our analysis, we follow Wagner et al. (2017) in selecting the CHES
variable “support for peace and security missions” as our dependent variable.3
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the relevant variables from CHES 2010
and 2014 across twenty-eight countries.
Conversely, the CMP data originates from qualitative codings of party election
programs across a wide range of policy domains. The CMP left–right scale results
from aggregating twenty-six indicators, half of which are related to rightist parties,
whereas the other half are associated with leftist parties. The scale ranges from −100
(most leftist) to +100 (most rightist), but most empirical cases are much closer to
the center, falling into a range from −50 to +50. In order to cross-validate the two
data sets on the left–right placement of political parties, table 2 shows the correla-
tions between CMP and CHES left–right indicators. All three of these show strong
correlations (ρ ∼ 0.600) that are statistically significant at the p < 0.0001 level.
This confirms that these two alternative measures of political partisanship arrive at
generally similar, though not identical, estimates of party placement, a result that
resonates with prior studies (cf. Bakker et al. 2015, 148–50).
For the involvement in military operations, we created an original data set
that includes eight recent military operations: the Kosovo War (1999), Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001), the Iraq War (2003), EUFOR Congo
(2006), UNIFIL II (2006), EUFOR Chad (2008), the Libya Intervention (2011),
and the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) (2014). The selected
2
For a detailed discussion of the general validity and reliability of CHES data, including question wording, see
Hooghe et al. (2010). Bakker et al. (2015) provide an update for the 2010 CHES survey, including data on the standard
deviation of experts’ placements by country.
3
The original CHES variable “international security” runs from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates strong opposition to
military deployments abroad. In line with Wagner et al. (2017), we have inverted this scale to have high positive scores
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for CHES 2010 and 2014








Support for peace and
security missions (mean)
Austria 13 5.985 5.626 4.122
Belgium 27 5.088 4.409 4.743
Bulgaria 21 5.844 6.322 4.451
Croatia 11 5.619 5.136 5.658
Cyprus 6 5.694 5.208 5.667
Czech Republic 16 5.470 5.228 5.319
Denmark 18 5.078 4.405 5.469
Estonia 12 5.566 4.738 7.292
Finland 16 5.321 4.916 4.844
France 22 5.234 5.065 4.946
Germany 16 5.219 5.054 4.443
Greece 16 4.954 5.337 4.080
Hungary 13 5.655 5.241 4.966
Ireland 13 3.795 4.168 4.006
Italy 27 4.592 4.851 4.987
Latvia 12 5.727 6.477 5.079
Lithuania 19 5.229 6.071 5.080
Luxembourg 6 4.500 2.833 6.500
Malta 2 5.750 3.500 4.167
Netherlands 21 5.262 4.978 5.143
Poland 16 5.790 5.965 4.867
Portugal 11 4.402 4.285 4.779
Romania 15 5.478 6.262 5.845
Slovenia 17 5.309 5.266 5.247
Slovakia 20 6.082 6.363 4.944
Spain 27 4.300 3.709 5.012
Sweden 20 5.397 4.098 5.249
United Kingdom 15 5.093 4.645 4.822
Total/mean 448 5.228 5.064 5.018
Note: “Support for Peace and Security Missions” has been recoded/inverted on the basis of the “Interna-
tional Security” variable.
Table 2. Correlations between CHES and CMP data sets
CHES Left–Right (2010–2014)
Rho p value
CMP Left–Right 0.600 0.000***
CMP Left–Right (Western Europe) 0.580 0.000***
CMP Left–Right (Eastern Europe) 0.605 0.000***
Note: *** = p < .0001.
operations vary considerably with regard to their goals, mandates, intensity, involve-
ment of international organizations, and legality under international law. This vari-
ety not only enhances the inferential value of the analyses but also allows us to ex-
amine the impact of government ideology in different types of military operations.
As argued in the theory section, the context of the operation can be expected
to have an impact on the link between government ideology and military par-
ticipation. Whereas right-wing government might be more inclined to support
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could be more supportive of operations with inclusive goals. Five of our military
operations mainly pursued inclusive goals. The Kosovo War and the Libya inter-
vention were humanitarian interventions—operations launched to protect civilians
from mass atrocities. UNIFIL II and EUFOR’s Congo and Chad can be catego-
rized as peacekeeping operations, aimed to promote peace and stability. Three
operations primarily pursued strategic goals. Operation Enduring Freedom and
the operation against IS were launched as antiterrorist missions. The proclaimed
goal of the Iraq War was to respond to a security threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction, allegedly developed by the regime of Saddam Hussein.
With regard to countries, the second part of our analysis focuses on twenty-four
EU member states. Given that the main element of the Kosovo War, Libya Inter-
vention, and anti-IS coalition was air strikes, countries without fighter jets were
not included as cases for these operations.4 Because of its opt-out in the European
Defence and Security Policy, Denmark is excluded for EUFOR’s Congo and Chad.
Romania and Bulgaria are not included as cases for EUFOR Chad because they
only joined the EU in 2007. This results in a sample of 173 country–operation
dyads. The dependent variable, military participation, is operationalized dichoto-
mously. Our codings are based on Haesebrouck (2017, 2018) and Mello (2014).
Seventy-five of our country–operation dyads were coded 1 on military participation;
98 were coded 0.
In line with the first part of our analysis, ideology is operationalized with the
CHES and CMP left–right indicators and the CHES GAL/TAN measure. Party
positions (n) are aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological
orientation by summing up each government party’s (i) ideological position (ip),
weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified





Table 3 provides an overview of the examined military operations and the mean
ideological position across the observed governments. Table A1 in the Online Ap-
pendix provides further details of the examined operations and an overview of the
participating and non-participating states. The relationship between government
ideology and military participation is assessed with Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficients and visualized with box plots.
Support for Peace and Security Missions
Figure 1 shows the relationship between party ideology on a left–right scale and
a party’s position toward peace and security missions. This figure is based on CHES
data from the 2010 and 2014 surveys (Bakker et al. 2015), including 448 political
parties from twenty-eight EU member states. The x-axis displays CHES left–right
scores, ranging from extreme left (0) to extreme right (10). The y-axis refers to a
party’s general support for their country’s troop deployments in peace and security
missions. A score of 10 indicates strong support, whereas a score of 0 denotes strong
opposition to such military deployments. Blue points refer to Western European
parties, whereas red points indicate parties from Eastern Europe.
Based on a quadratic function, the solid line shows that the relationship between
party ideology and support for military missions is curvilinear. Far-left parties are
least supportive of military missions, whereas center–right parties are most support-
ive, and support decreases again as one moves to the far-right end of the political
4
According to the IISS (2014) military balance, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Slovenia do
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Table 3. Military operations and party ideology
Country
Military
operation Timeframe Type Military participants
Military
non-participants








































































































































spectrum. The quadratic model is statistically highly significant (p < 0.0001) with
an R2 of 0.4089.5 Going beyond the analysis of Wagner et al. (2017, 2018), figure 1
5
By comparison, the linear model is also statistically highly significant (p < 0.0001), but with an R2 of only 0.2214
it covers much less variance. To check whether it is appropriate to describe the empirical relationship as curvilinear,
we have also conducted the “two-line” approach, suggested by Simonsohn (2018). The results show that there are
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Figure 1. Party ideology (CHES Left–Right) and position toward peace and security
missions
also shows the difference between parties in Western and Eastern Europe with
regard to their support for peace and security missions. Apart from the fact that
there are fewer far-left parties in Eastern Europe and more far-right parties, the
distribution is similar to that in Western Europe. The curvilinear pattern holds also
when analyzing Eastern and Western European subsets of the data. However, as
expected, the effect of party ideology on support for military missions is stronger
among Western European parties. While the quadratic model is statistically highly
significant for both Eastern and Western European subsets (p < 0.0001), for
Western parties R2 is 0.5604 and for Eastern parties R2 is only 0.1738.
In summary, the CHES data thus supports the notion that parties on the political
right are generally more supportive of military operations than leftist parties. This
can be seen from the curve, which reaches its peak among center–right parties
(scores between 6 and 7). Moreover, all parties on the far left (scores below 2)
oppose military deployments for peace and security missions. However, contrary
to expectations of a linear relationship between partisanship and political support
for military missions, the data also show that there is curvilinearity, confirming
the results of Wagner et al. (2017, 2018). This means that parties in the political
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Figure 2. Party ideology (CHES GAL/TAN) and position toward peace and security
missions
spectrum. This is an important finding because it qualifies expectations that are still
widely found in the literature, namely, that the more to the right political parties
are, the more they will be in favor of military measures. While this is true for the
political spectrum in the center, far-right parties are substantially less supportive
of peace and security missions. Finally, while the results for both Eastern and
Western Europe are statistically significant, the smaller effect in Eastern Europe
resonates with findings from prior studies that have shown political ideology to be
less consequential as a predictor in Eastern Europe, arguably because of differences
in the consolidation of the party systems (Schuster and Maier 2006; Mello 2014).
Using an alternative measure of political ideology, figure 2 replaces the
CHES left–right position with the “new politics” dimension (GAL/TAN) from
the CHES data set, which ranges from libertarian/post-materialist (0) to tradi-
tional/authoritarian (10). The plot confirms the curvilinear relationship identified
by Wagner et al. (2017, 2018) between party position and support for peace and
security missions. For the GAL/TAN dimension, the peak is close to the ideological
center and it declines almost equally on both ends. This means that parties are
less supportive of military missions the more pronounced their ideological posi-
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Figure 3. Party ideology (CMP Left–Right) and position toward peace and security mis-
sions
libertarian/post-materialist pole (e.g., the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda) or close to
the traditional/authoritarian extreme (e.g., the Bulgarian Ataka). The quadratic
model is statistically highly significant (p < 0.0001) with an R2 of 0.1286. This
pattern also holds when the data is split into Western and Eastern European subsets
of Eastern and Western European parties. Both of these are statistically highly
significant (p < 0.0001).6 Nonetheless, the comparatively low R2 means that the
GAL/TAN dimension accounts for less variation than the CHES left–right scale.
As a robustness test, we also examine whether the identified pattern holds when
replacing the CHES left–right scores with another estimate of party positions.
Figure 3 exchanges the CHES data with respective left–right scores from the CMP
data set (Volkens et al. 2013). This is based on a consolidated data file with 261
political parties from twenty-six EU member states, for the period from 2008 to
2016. The data combine the CHES scores for the support of peace and security
missions from the 2010 and 2014 CHES surveys with CMP party ideology data based
on election programs. The 2010 CHES scores were assigned to CMP parties from
July 2008 through June 2012, whereas the 2014 CHES scores were assigned to CMP
6
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Figure 4. Party family (CHES) and position toward peace and security missions
parties from July 2012 through June 2016. The figure shows that the previously
identified pattern between support for peace and security missions and political
partisanship is not an artifact of the CHES data. To the contrary, a similar curvilinear
relationship is also found for the CMP data and the relationship is also statistically
highly significant (p < 0.0001) with an R2 of 0.1167. Parties on the political right
tend to provide more support to peace and security missions than parties on the
left, but this support drops as one moves into the far-right spectrum of parties.
Apart from using left–right estimates of party positions, parties can be classified
according to their party family. Figure 4 displays a box plot of an ANOVA analysis
for party family (aligned on a left–right scale) and position toward peace and
security missions. This analysis draws on a total of 219 political parties, as opposed
to 161 included in Wagner et al. (2017), because we include both CHES surveys
from 2010 and 2014. Moreover, we distinguish between Eastern and Western Euro-
pean parties. The figure shows, for instance, that radical left parties are a Western
European phenomenon and that there are only two parties in Eastern Europe
classified as such. That being said, our analysis arrives at results similar to Wagner
et al. (2017), confirming the curvilinear relationship, where support for peace and
security missions is strong among centrist parties and increases the further to the
right a political party stands, but drops for parties on the ends of the spectrum
(Radical Left, Greens, and Radical Right parties). Notably, though, the results are
not statistically significant for Eastern European parties.
Table 4 summarizes the ANOVA analysis of support for peace and security mis-
sions by party family for the entire data set and divided into Western and Eastern
Europe. The results confirm that substantive differences exist between political
parties and their positions on security policy. Clearly, Conservatives and Christian
Democrats are most supportive of military measures in terms of deployments for
peace and security missions, followed by Liberals and Socialists. Support drops
substantially toward the political extremes: the Radical Left and the Radical Right
are the two party families that are least supportive of military missions. For our
data, the results are even more pronounced than those reported by Wagner et al.
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Table 4. ANOVA analysis of support for peace and security missions by party family (CHES)
Party family N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Western and Eastern Europe***
Radical Left 24 2.189 1.115 0.9 4.6
Greens 23 4.284 0.905 2.7 6.1
Socialists 45 5.722 1.298 1.8 8.6
Liberals 41 6.020 1.096 4.4 8.9
Conservatives and Christian
Democrats
59 6.428 1.040 4.3 9.0
Radical Right 27 3.539 1.477 0.8 5.7
Western Europe***
Radical Left 22 2.251 1.146 0.9 4.6
Greens 15 3.934 0.826 2.7 5.0
Socialists 29 5.709 1.346 1.8 8.5
Liberals 21 6.290 0.969 4.8 8.5
Conservatives and Christian
Democrats
32 6.540 0.817 4.8 8.5
Radical Right 16 4.343 0.944 2.5 5.7
Eastern Europe ***
Radical Left 2 1.510 0.103 1.4 1.6
Greens 8 4.940 0.676 3.9 6.1
Socialists 16 5.745 1.248 3.7 8.6
Liberals 20 5.737 1.172 4.4 8.9
Conservatives and Christian
Democrats
27 6.295 1.258 4.3 9.0
Radical Right 11 2.369 1.341 0.8 5.6
Note: ***p < 0.0001.
Democrats, we find a mean of 6.428 for this party family and the scores for Radical
Left and Radical Right are both lower than those in Wagner et al. (2017), which
means that there is an even stronger curvilinear relationship.
Support for Specific Military Operations
The second part of our analysis focuses on the link between government ideology
and participation in the eight military operations. The relationship is assessed
with Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. This non-parametric statistic does
not require assumptions of normally distributed data or random selection. The
differences between military participants and non-participants are visualized with
box plots. The latter allow to straightforwardly examine the distribution of party
positions of the governments of participating and non-participating countries.
First, all operations are examined across the different indicators of ideology. Subse-
quently, the analyses examine whether the context of the operation has an impact
on the relationship between ideology and military participation. Lastly, different
groups of member states are examined.
Table 5 presents Spearman’s rank correlations between different measures of gov-
ernment ideology and military participation in the operations under investigation.
The analysis of all countries across all operations suggests that there is no significant
relation between the CHES indicators and military participation, while there is only
a weak and negative correlation with the CMP left–right indicator. Figure 5 displays
a box plot that visualizes the latter relation. The box plot does not suggest strong
differences between the ideological orientation of the governments that decided
to participate in an operation and governments that decided not to participate,
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Table 5. Correlations between party ideology and participation in military operations
CMP Left–Right CHES Left–Right CHES GAL/TAN
Rho p value Rho p value Rho p value
All countries
All operations −0.147 0.053 −0.066 0.388 −0.019 0.807
Strategic goals 0.093 0.456 −0.054 0.666 −0.033 0.794
Inclusive goals −0.25 0.01 −0.095 0.334 0.022 0.821
Humanitarian intervention −0.183 0.272 −0.192 0.248 0.123 0.464
Peacekeeping operation −0.289 0.017 −0.023 0.851 −0.043 0.729
Eastern Europe
All operations −0.302 0.014 −0.127 0.31 0.16 0.2
Strategic goals −0.256 0.207 −0.334 0.096 −0.156 0.448
Inclusive goals −0.228 0.158 0.213 0.187 0.415 0.008
Humanitarian intervention — — — — — —
Peacekeeping operation −0.184 0.35 0.323 0.094 0.5 0.007
Western Europe
All operations −0.042 0.667 −0.001 0.993 −0.037 0.704
Strategic goals 0.244 0.124 0.094 0.558 0.064 0.69
Inclusive goals −0.064 0.608 −0.034 0.787 −0.049 0.695
Humanitarian intervention 0.033 0.872 0.067 0.746 0.294 0.144
Peacekeeping operation −0.125 0.442 −0.125 0.442 −0.321 0.044
Small countries
All operations −0.374 0.001 −0.184 0.104 −0.015 0.896
Strategic goals −0.22 0.234 −0.272 0.139 −0.142 0.445
Inclusive goals −0.462 0.001 −0.111 0.451 0.139 0.347
Humanitarian intervention — — — — — —
Peacekeeping operation −0.571 0 −0.043 0.808 0.201 0.255
Large countries
All operations 0.007 0.95 0.042 0.686 0.041 0.692
Strategic goals 0.283 0.095 0.089 0.606 0.03 0.864
Inclusive goals −0.074 0.582 0.015 0.91 0.162 0.226
Humanitarian intervention −0.097 0.651 0 1 0.452 0.027
Peacekeeping operation 0 1 0.055 0.757 −0.118 0.506
Note: None of the small or Eastern European countries participated in one of the humanitarian interven-
tions.
This indicates that left-leaning governments were more inclined to actually partic-
ipate in the operations under investigation than their right-leaning counterparts.
These counterintuitive results might be related to the fact that the impact of ide-
ology on foreign policy preferences depends on the type of military operation. As
argued in the theory section, left-leaning governments might be more inclined to
support operations with inclusive goals. In contrast, right-wing governments could
be more supportive of operations that are launched to defend narrower national
interests. In line with the results across all operations, there are only significant cor-
relations for the CMP left–right indicator. Figure 6 visualizes the relation between
government ideology operationalized with the CMP indicator and participation
in different types of operations. In line with theoretical expectations, the box plot
shows that the countries that participated in operations with inclusive goals were
generally governed by left-leaning parties. The conclusion that that left-leaning
governments were more inclined to participate in operations with inclusive goals
than their right-leaning counterparts is confirmed by the negative Kendall rank
correlation coefficient. However, the differences are more significant in the set of
peacekeeping operations than in the set of humanitarian interventions. The Spear-
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Figure 5. Government ideology (CMP) and participation in military operations
is only significant for peacekeeping operations.7 In contrast, there is no significant
correlation between government ideology and military participation in operations
with strategic goals.
Subsequently, different groups of member states were examined. First, the
analysis examines whether there are differences between the member states with
7
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Figure 6. Government ideology (CMP) and military participation: inclusive versus strate-
gic goals
(relatively) small and large military capabilities.8 The results presented in table 5
indicate that left-wing governments were more inclined to participate in military
operations than right-wing governments: there is a significant negative correlation
between the CMP left–right indicator and military participation among the small
member states. The differences are even more pronounced when looking at differ-
ent types of operations.9 For the large member states, there is a significant positive
correlation between government ideology and military participation for operations
with strategic goals and no significant correlation for operations that pursue
8
The average military spending between 2005 and 2014, retrieved from SIPRI (2018), was used to operationalize
military capabilities, with the median used as threshold to distinguish between small and large states.
9
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inclusive goals. In contrast, for the small member states a significant negative
correlation exists for operations with inclusive goals, but there is no significant cor-
relation for strategic operations. This suggests that humanitarian and peacekeeping
operations are likely to be subject to political conflict in the smaller member states,
but not in the larger states. The results support the hypothesis that right-leaning
governments are more inclined to participate in strategic operations. The absence
of support for this hypothesis in small states might be explained by the fact that
these often lack the military capabilities to participate in these generally larger
operations, resulting in non-significant findings. In fact, only seven small states
participated in strategic operations.
Second, we focus on differences between Eastern and Western European states.
The results show a significant negative correlation between the CMP right–left
indicator and military participation among Eastern European states, indicating
that left-wing governments were more likely to participate in operations than
right-leaning governments, while no significant correlation was found among
Western European states. In contrast to the results of the first part of our anal-
ysis, this suggests that partisanship patterns are more pronounced in Eastern
Europe. However, given that nine out of ten Eastern European states are in the
group of small states, this might also be an artifact of the differences between
large and small states. Lastly, the analysis also shows contradictory results for
the GAL/TAN indicator.10 The significant negative correlation between this in-
dicator and military participation in peacekeeping operations among Western
European States indicates that libertarian/post-materialist executives are more
inclined to participate in these operations. In contrast, the significant positive
correlation among Eastern European states suggests that traditional/authoritarian
governments were more likely to provide military contributions to peacekeeping
operations.
Discussion
Although the study of domestic politics is constitutive to foreign policy analysis
and political parties are an essential part of the domestic politics of democra-
cies, party politics has long been neglected in the study of foreign policy (cf.
introduction to this special issue). The results of the analyses presented in this
paper suggest that party politics has an impact on foreign policy decisions, but
that the traditional distinction between a “pro-peace left” and a “pro-military
right” does not suffice for explaining military deployment decisions of modern
democracies.
The first part of our analysis, which examines the relationship between political
ideology and support for peace and security operations as indicated in the CHES
database, suggests that right-leaning parties are more in favor of troop deployments.
However, the relationship between party ideology and support for military missions
is curvilinear, which implies that parties in the political center are more supportive
of troop deployments than extreme left and extreme right parties. Likewise, parties
on both ends of the GAL/TAN scale are less supportive of military missions, irre-
spective of whether they are located close to the libertarian/post-materialist pole
or the traditional/authoritarian extreme. Still, the new politics dimension accounts
for less variation in support for military deployment than the traditional left–right
difference. Generally, the results of the first part of the analysis confirm the conclu-
sions of prior research: party-political differences regarding military deployments
are structured around the right–left axis, with right-leaning parties being more
supportive of military operations than left-wing parties (cf. inter alia Arena and
Palmer 2009; Palmer, Regan, and London 2004; Wagner et al. 2017, 2018).
10
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The second part of our analysis, however, suggests that the relationship between
political ideology and military deployment is more complex than suggested by
the binary distinction between the pro-military right and the pro-peace left. Our
analysis did not provide convincing evidence that right-wing governments were
more inclined to participate in the eight military operations under investigation.
In fact, the results suggest that left-leaning governments were actually more likely
to participate in military operations. This indicates that the stronger support of
rightist parties for troop deployment does not translate into a greater inclination
of right-wing governments to deploy forces.
A conceivable explanation for these diverging results could be that the cor-
relation between the CHES left–right indicator and the “support for peace and
security missions” measure is an artifact of how the former is constructed. More
specifically, experts might take a party’s position toward peace and security oper-
ations into account when they judge its overall “ideological stance.” However, a
party’s position on the left–right axis is determined by a wide range of factors, most
importantly their position toward socio-economic issues. Moreover, the relationship
is also found when using the CMP left–right measure, of which only two out of
twenty-six categories are related to a party’s general attitude toward the military.
In consequence, the strong correlation between a party’s ideological position and
its attitude toward peace and security operations cannot be fully attributed to the
potential conceptual overlap between the variables.
Another possible explanation is related to a general disadvantage of expert
survey data: party positions are generally based on long-run party reputations
(Klingemann et al. 2006, 64). The large-N studies on the link between the use of
force and executive ideology that focus on the Cold War period provide evidence
that right-leaning parties are more likely to support the use of force (Palmer,
Regan, and London 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009). As argued in the theory
section, recent case-based research shows that the link between party-politics and
military deployment has been affected by changes in goals and mandates of military
operations following the end of the Cold War (Rathbun 2004). However, given that
“expert surveys lack a dynamic quality,” the scores on “the support for peace and
security missions” measure might reflect the political party’s reputation rather than
their current positions toward military deployment (Klingemann et al. 2006, 64).
The most important limitation of the “the support for peace and security mis-
sions” indicator is that it measures the general support of a political party for troop
deployments in peace and security operations, without differentiating between
types of operations. The second part of our analysis confirms conclusions from
previous case-based studies that the link between military deployment and party-
politics depends on the context of the operation. More specifically, the results show
that right-wing governments were only more inclined to participate in strategic
operations. Left-leaning governments were more likely to participate in operations
with inclusive goals. This is especially the case in peacekeeping operations.
Case-based evidence from the operations under investigation supports this
conclusion. Rathbun’s study (2004, 46), for example, suggests that the vehement
advocacy of the British government for a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is
best explained by the leftist ideology of Tony Blair’s Labour party, which “consid-
ered upholding human rights as part of the national interest.” Likewise, Auerswald
and Saideman (2014, 211) conclude that the left-wing governments of Belgium,
Denmark, and Norway were “at least partially motivated” by humanitarian beliefs
when they decided to participate in the Libya operation. This contrasts sharply with
Italy’s right-wing Berlusconi government’s policy toward the Libyan crisis, which
only decided to contribute to the operation to preserve its economic interests
(Lombardi 2011). Haesebrouck (2015) shows that, in the absence such interests,
only left-wing coalitions made a substantial contribution to the 2006 reinforcement
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right-wing members of the Belgian parliament more strongly emphasized the
threat posed by IS to Belgian security during debates on participating in the air
strikes against the terrorist group, suggesting that right-leaning parties accord more
importance to national interests.
Conclusion
Are there genuine ideological differences between political parties on issues re-
lated to the use of force in international relations? And how do such differences
influence decisions on participation in military operations? This paper provided
a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between party-political ideology,
their position toward peace and security missions, and their actual deployments in
military operations between 1999 and 2014. The results of the analysis presented
in this paper suggest essential differences between the general position of polit-
ical parties on peace and security missions, on the one hand, and the impact of
party-political ideology on military deployment decisions, on the other hand.
In the first part of our analysis, we examined the relationship between political
ideology and the general support for peace and security operations as indicated
in the CHES database. The results provide strong support for the first hypothesis
of the introduction to this special issue (Raunio and Wagner 2020), which expects
right-leaning parties to be more supportive of military operations. Yet, the results
also show that the empirical pattern is curvilinear: centrist and center–right parties
witness the highest level of support for military missions, while parties on both ends
of the political spectrum show substantially less support. This result resonates with
recent studies (Wagner et al. 2017, 2018).
Importantly, the stronger support of rightist parties for peace and security
missions does not translate into a greater inclination of right-wing governments
to actually deploy forces for military operations. The second part of our analysis
suggests that leftist governments were actually more inclined to participate in
operations than their right-leaning counterparts, although the effect is small when
all operations are included in the analysis. Examining different types of military op-
erations suggests that this is mainly the result of the greater inclination of left-wing
executives to participate in operations with inclusive goals, such as peacekeeping
operations and humanitarian interventions. In fact, right-leaning governments
were more inclined to participate in strategic operations. While the analysis, thus,
does not support hypothesis six of the introductory article (which expects left
governments to be less inclined to use military force), it does provide evidence
for the proposition that political ideology does not have the same impact on all
types of military intervention (Raunio and Wagner 2020). In contrast to the second
hypothesis, the results suggest that party-political differences remain relevant for
more humanitarian operations (in this collection, see also Pennings 2020).
More generally, the results of our analysis demonstrate the importance of
distinguishing between different types of military operations when examining
party-political positions on military deployments. Neither research based on expert
surveys nor previous quantitative analyses of the link between government ideology
and military deployment decisions consider the substantial differences between
military operations, which might explain the reason why they consistently confirm
that right-wing parties are more inclined to support the use of force. Our study
clearly shows how important it is to differentiate between military operations
to arrive at a more complete and nuanced understanding of the link between
party-politics and military deployments.
Supplemental Information
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